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The purpose of this paper is to build an integrative framework for our 
understanding of the firm which would embrace all alternative theories in 
the field into one logical scheme. There are multiple views of the firm — 
microeconomic view, transactional costs view, legal view, organizational 
theory view, resource-based view, knowledge-based view, relationship 
marketing and others. The main idea of this paper is that all arguments of 
these approaches may be systematized and built into one integrative 
framework which may be called a general theory of the firm. 
Any theory of the firms should answer three basic questions: 1) what is 
the firm and why does it exist, 2) how the boundaries of the firm are de-
termined, 3) how internal organizational structure of the firm is deter-
mined. A general theory of the firm should answer all these questions in 
that way that would make its answers valid for every particular size or type 
of firm — from SMEs to MNEs, from the traditional U-structure to all 
types of hybrid or network quasi-firms, from aging traditional industries to 
highly dynamic and innovative sectors.  
All theoretical knowledge about the firm may be subdivided at a core 
theory which defines and explains the basics of every firm’s existence and 
is relevant in any context and for any particular issue under consideration, 
and at some extensions which may be understood as emphasizing of par-
ticular elements of firm’s life or particular factors which influence the 
firm’s boundaries and structure, e.g. knowledge or cultural issues. It is very 
important to underline that those extensions and interpretations are not al-
ternative lines of explanations comparatively to the core theory, but only 
focusing on particular elements in its framework. We could say that every-
thing is in the core theory, and nothing actually new can be added to it. Of 
course, this is not to say that additions and interpretations are useless. They 
help to stress some important sides of reality and to look at them through 
different lens but the core theory stays unchanged in all these theoretical 
journeys.  
 
I. THE CORE THEORY 
The core theory of the firm states fundamental definition of the firm 
and enlists all major factors which determine its size and structure. It is 
built upon one simple idea from the economic theory — the market system 
demands for rational and responsible decisions on allocation of resources. 
Rational means maximizing benefits, responsible means caring about costs. 
The fundamental relationship: employer-employee 
A number of different definitions of the firm had been developed in 
economics, management and organizational literature in 20th century. Nev-
ertheless, after all these developments the most fundamental idea of firm 
existence is still a Knightian one and may be explained in this way. 
The firm appears in the market economy, which is built upon vertical 
and horizontal division of labor. Division of labor allows reducing costs 
because of economy of scale — when every individual concentrates on 
some specific task in the production the average costs go down. Before the 
division of labour reaches certain extent every job in the market economy 
may be conducted by an individual who personally takes care of all busi-
ness decisions at this job. But after some moment these decisions about in-
vestments and production cannot be taken by the jobholder. A new “mana-
gerial” division of labor takes place — one person (entrepreneur) takes in-
vestments and production decisions and bears risk, and the other person 
(employee) only implements these decisions. Accordingly, the entrepre-
neur gets profit (a residual income) and the employee gets wage (a fixed 
payment).  
This business model is called a firm. The firm begins when and where 
the entrepreneur hires his first employee. All other characteristics — legal 
entity, ownership, organization, hierarchy etc. — are only some conse-
quences or developments of this basic fact. All other theoretical issues and 
implications in the theory of the firm — size, structure, hybrid forms etc. 
— are only some kind of variation and modification of this elementary re-
lationship.  
This basic idea was developed by Knight (1921) and confirmed by 
Coase (1937). A more detailed review of this theory development may be 
found in the beginning of the section III. 
Managerial hierarchy  
If the entrepreneur is successful and his firm starts to grow at a moment 
the employer finds that he/she cannot handle all decisions and needs help. 
Then the entrepreneur starts to hire assistants and the managerial hierarchy 
appears — a team of managers between the entrepreneur and all other em-
ployees. These managers are specialists in developing and implementing 
business decisions — the very same function which was transferred from 
employees to employer when the firm was born. 
Inside this hierarchy everybody obeys to administrative commands in-
stead of market signals, and this is what was emphasized by Coase when 
he was writing about the nature of the firm. But the fundamental essence of 
the firm is NOT the hierarchy as a coordination mechanism but the divi-
sion of risk and responsibility. The coordination mechanism (hierarchy) is 
only a managerial tool which helps the entrepreneur to operate this busi-
ness model with divided risk and responsibilities. This managerial tool is 
very important and a lot of things depend on its characteristics. But it is not 
a firm. It exists inside the firm. The managerial hierarchy helps the firm to 
be big but it does not constitute the firm.  
The enlargement logic 
How big? Where boundaries of the firm should be set? The first and 
the very simple answer is the bigger the better. Every additional sector of 
production added to the firm can bring extra profits to the entrepreneur. So 
from the point of view of the entrepreneur the boundary of the firms should 
be maximized because it earns extra money.  
This is what we may call the basic enlargement logic of firm’s size de-
termination. Following this logic, many companies or businessmen like to 
buy other companies simply because this increases their total profit. If a 
businessman earns a lot of profit in one business he/she wants to own an-
other business and to earn additional profit from it.   
Sometime this firm’s enlargement leads to growth of market power and 
may help to increase the market price — we may call this strategy market 
power logic — but this strategy has nothing to do with the firm itself. The 
market power logic is not about the firm but about control of the supply 
and demand. The purpose of market power logic is to increase the price, 
and it may be pursued without buying other companies, e.g. through a tacit 
collusion or cartel. Contrary, the purpose of the enlargement logic is to ac-
quire profits (big or small) from other parts of production chain — some-
times horizontal integration. Both strategies — enlargement logic and mar-
ket power logic may be pursued simultaneously but this fact also does not 
make them the same.  
There is much sense in the simple enlargement logic, and it explains 
why many businessmen buy new companies in the same or other industries 
when they have free funds. These large integrated companies may be com-
paratively inefficient but they may continue to exist if they earn enough re-
sources to compensate this inefficiency (e.g. through monopolistic position 
in a market). Nevertheless, as we will see further in many cases this en-
largement logic (the bigger the better) simply does not work. There are two 
types of factors — behavioral and technological — which interfere and 
lead to other conclusions. Now we are going to explore these factors in 
more detail. 
Behavioral factors (opportunism) 
The main factor which interferes into the simple enlargement logic and 
radically changes its implications is the behavioral one. The problem is that 
all people are rational actors and prone to selfish behavior. In market con-
tracts they are interested in maximizing their own benefits and not the ben-
efits of the partner, and if it is possible to increase secretly the former at the 
expense of the latter they just do it. Particularly, if they are hired as agents 
(managers in the hierarchy) they maximize their own welfare and not the 
welfare of their principals. This secret benefiting at the expense of other 
party is called opportunism and comprises one of the main concerns of the 
contract theory — a special branch of economic theory dealing with prob-
lems of efficient management of contractual relationships.  
There are two types of opportunism — precontractual and postcon-
tractual, or ex ante and ex post in terminology of the pioneer of this theory 
(Williamson 1985). Both types suppose hiding some important information 
about some element of the deal.  
In the first case — pre-contractual opportunism — this element is al-
ready materialized and cannot be changed, so the strategy of more in-
formed part is to conceal this information and the strategy of less informed 
party is the reveal this information before the deal. The most common 
strategy here is 
• Hiding value. The buyer or seller hides the real value of the good 
from other side of the deal. The most often case is when the seller 
knows that the good has a lower value than the price under nego-
tiation but hides this information from the buyer. The opposite 
may happen less often because usually the seller is a more in-
formed party in questions of quality of the good. Nevertheless, in 
industrial markets it may be also an important case because the 
value of intermediate good is usually determined not only by his 
physical quality but by some production and market opportunities 
which are known mostly to the buyer.  
In the second case — post-contractual opportunism — this element 
is not materialized yet and it could be materialized because of the actions 
of more informed party and the strategy of less informed party is to prevent 
this behavior of the partner. Here we have two common strategies of op-
portunistic behavior.  
• Hiding costs (moral hazard). When one party (agent) agrees to 
fulfill certain services in the interests of another party (principal) it 
may fulfill its responsibilities in such a way that is not beneficial to 
the principal. The main strategy is the economizing of agent’s ef-
forts or shirking. Another strategy is to reload possible risks of 
some potential damage on the principal.  
• Hold-up. When a contract is made and being executed some bilat-
eral market power is created and if one side of the contract gets 
more market power it can exploit the vulnerability of other party 
and demand for a higher reward. 
Both types of opportunism are critically important to effective contract-
ing, though sometimes it is not easy to say which type — postcontractual 
or precontractual — takes place because the sequence of actions or princi-
ples of pricing and specifying the product may be different in various con-
tracts.  
In some contracts the service is specified only after the contract is 
signed. Here, the agent may boost value of some operations in the eyes of 
the principal and impose unnecessary services to the latter — this is the 
strategy of hiding value but it is practiced after the contract is made. 
In some contracts at the stage of contract negotiation the pricing proce-
dure may be based on cost plus methodology and here the buyer may be 
interested in boosting its costs — this is the strategy of hiding costs but it is 
practiced before the contract is signed.    
As we can see sometimes it is hard to say is it precontractual or post-
contractual opportunism. The crucial moment here is the issue of materi-
alization of the hidden element. If it has materialized already and cannot be 
changed this is precontractual opportunism and vice versa. 
Our next logical step is to discuss another important group of factors 
describing some fundamental characteristics of every particular case where 
a decision about firm’s size should be taken.   
Technological factors 
These factors play an important role in our story because they create a 
structural landscape at which contractual relationships take place. This 
structural landscape determines the technical possibilities for secret or ap-
parent benefiting at the expense of others — in other words, establishes 
opportunities for opportunism.1 Let us describe these structural characteris-
tics and analyze how they can influence on the decisions about firm’s size 
and structure. 
Joint capital good. The first fundamental characteristic of technology 
is indivisibility of some factors of production. The economy of scale very 
often demands for using of some “large” capital assets which should be 
operated (or used) by a number of workers. The average costs of this way 
of production are much lower than average costs of an alternative technol-
ogy where every worker has his own “small” capital asset for the same 
purpose. The examples of these “large” capital assets may be equipment, 
land, buildings and so on. Another important aspect of this “large” capital 
asset is that it is used and depreciated for a long period of time. But this 
aspect is much less important for our purposes than indivisibility of this 
capital good. Who should own these capital assets during all process of 
their use and what contracts should be written to allow individual workers 
to use it? The most efficient answer is the firm — the entrepreneur invests 
in the production of the capital asset and hires employees, taking all risks 
of making this business profitable. There may be an exception— produc-
tion or distribution cooperatives where the joint capital good (e.g. mill or 
oil mill) is collectively owned by several individual producers who exploit 
it by turn for processing their own intermediary products which are then 
sold individually at the market or used in private consumption.   
Joint product. The second fundamental characteristic of technology is 
indivisibility of some goods, which should be produced by teams of work-
ers. These workers should apply their labour to production of this good si-
multaneously or consequently — it does not matter. The key issue is that it 
is hard to measure the exact contribution and responsibility of every team 
member for the final result of the team activity. So, the question is how can 
we be sure that there is no shirking in these teams? In other words, how 
can we be sure that nobody secretly cuts his or her efforts which should be 
in these teams? The most efficient answer here is again the firm which 
owner may be motivated to monitor the shirking of all team members (Al-
chian Demsetz 1972). Another important problem here is similar to the 
situation of the joint capital good — who should own the joint product if 
                                        
1 Williamson (1985) criticized attempts to explain boundaries of the firm solely 
through technological factors as "technological determinism."  Nevertheless, these fac-
tors play crucial role and influence decisions about the firm’s size through behavioral 
factors.  
the production cycle is long and demands for relatively high investments? 
This is another argument for the firm appearance. 
Unique good. The good is new and was never sold at any market so 
both parties do not know its exact market value. They could try to invest in 
getting some information but when they do not trust each other this process 
may be very costly. For example, this may be a new invention, a new piece 
of art, a new deposit of a natural resource, and so on. Sometimes, the high 
costs of contracting may lead to the appearance of the firm but in many 
cases these costs may be reduced through designing of a special contract 
with variable price depending on the future benefits of the buyer.  
Bilateral monopoly. The quality of the good is well known but there 
are only one buyer and one seller of the product. They should negotiate the 
price and could hide from each other their true evaluation of this good. 
This bargaining over joint profit distribution may be very costly.  
Immeasurable products. The quality of some products and services 
cannot be specified and controlled by the principal. It may be a product or 
service with subjective quality which can be very difficult to measure be-
cause it has subjective nature. E.g. the designer develops a web-site, or 
consultant develops some recommendations to the managers of the com-
pany. Sometime this job may not have any material traces at all, e.g. sam-
pling in stores, handing out advertisements, calling clients etc.  
Professional knowledge. These services cannot be monitored by prin-
cipal without special knowledge of some professional field. E.g. R&D ac-
tivity or legal consultations — the principal may not understand in full 
depth all details of technological or legal issues which are involved in tak-
ing crucial decisions about size of investments and choice of strategies in 
these fields and may be manipulated by a more informed agent.  
Hidden heterogeneous quality. There are many potential sellers of a 
product who deliver different qualities of this product but this may be re-
vealed only after some time (if ever) after the contract is made. Revealing 
of this quality before the sale may be very costly or simply impossible. As 
a consequence, there is an adverse selection effect in this market (Akerlof, 
1970, Spence, 1973). 
Specific asset. In the economy with deep vertical and horizontal divi-
sion of labor some intermediary products may be used in many different 
industries but others only in one or very few of them. This characteristic of 
an intermediary good is its degree of specificity. The more specific an in-
termediary good is the less demand it may find in other industries This 
characteristic has an enormously important implication. The intermediary 
goods with large demand from many industries may be produced in much 
larger scale. The large market allows for a competition of producers, for 
standards of quality and so on. Contrary, specific intermediary goods cre-
ate great market power of the buyer over the seller (Klein Crawford Al-
chian 1978). 
External factor. Sometimes the product of agent may be easily meas-
urable in quality and quantity but there is a possibility of positive or nega-
tive influence of some external factor on the final result of the production 
process. In this case the agent may shirk and explain the bad result with 
“external factor influence”. The important characteristics of this factor are 
its non-controllable and non-observable nature (Cheung 1969, Stiglitz 
1974). 
All these technological factors of particular industry or sector deter-
mine possibilities of various behavioral strategies (different kinds of op-
portunism) and eventually benefits and costs of alternative organizational 
forms. The main hypothesis of the general theory of the firm is that the en-
trepreneur chooses those organizational forms which demonstrate the 
maximum net benefits comparatively to all other alternatives. This is a 
neoclassical logic and there is still no better logic in modern economic and 
managerial sciences. Some alternative approaches will be discussed later in 
the section on extensions but we will see that at best these approaches have 
some complementary value to the core theory and its main optimization 
hypothesis.  
II. FIVE INTEGRATION DILEMMAS 
In this section we will discuss main organizational dilemmas which are 
solved by the entrepreneur who tries to define boundaries of his/her firm. 
There are five basic types of dilemmas reflecting different relatedness of 
sectors which may be integrated in one firm or stay separated in different 
firms. 
Before we start with the description of these dilemmas we can make a 
general conclusion valid for all dilemmas. Taking into account all techno-
logical factors described in the previous section we can see that the produc-
tion space is not continuous and divisible at any point, and boundary of the 
firm simply cannot be drawn everywhere. All production space consists 
from more or less indivisible sectors, and each one of them simply cannot 
be split between different firms. Boundaries of firms can be realistically 
drawn only between these indivisible sectors. For example, if we look at an 
assembly line or blast furnace or at the chain of continuous operations we 
can easily see that costs of potential opportunism is so high that we can 
never imagine these jobs to be separated between independent firms.  
Vertical integration 
The dilemma of vertical integration concerns decisions about integration 
of various stages in production of one product.  
Usually this problem is known as make-or-buy dilemma faced by the 
firm which needs some intermediate product and decides should it create 
its own department to produce the component internally or it is better to 
buy this intermediary product in the market.2   
This is really one of the most important contexts of vertical integration 
choice but there is another no less important issue which may be called 
sell-or-process further — the company should decide if it wants to sell its 
product to independent distributors or distribute it to final costumers by it-
self.  
These two types of integration are known as integration backward (up-
stream) and integration forward (downstream) and comprise equally im-
portant organization choices which are faced by the firm. Nevertheless, 
these two situations may be analyzed as one common situation because the 
nature of arguments will be the same on both of them. In both cases the 
company compares costs of two alternatives — vertical integration and 
market contracting — and chooses the most efficient variant. These costs 
represent various threats of pre-contractual and post-contractual opportun-
istic behavior. Let us describe them. 
Market contracting creates three opportunistic threats: 1) cost exaggera-
tion, i.e. the independent supplier may overstate the real costs of produc-
tion, 2) hold-up, i.e. the company may hold-up its supplier or the supplier 
may hold-up the company if a specific asset is at place (Klein, Crawford, 
Alchian 1978), 3) moral hazard, i.e. the supplier reacts slowly, does not in-
vest in R&D, etc. All these opportunistic behaviors may lead to high costs 
of having independent contractors.  
Vertical integration may remove these threats because the company may 
get the full information about costs of its own department, the company 
cannot be held up by its own department and the company may give order 
to its own department to act in this way as it is necessary to the company. 
But vertical integration is not an opportunism-free solution to this problem 
because it creates another important threat of opportunistic behavior — the 
possibility of shirking. The manager of internal department is protected 
from possible losses and does not have rights for possible profits from his 
department activity. That is why this manager does not have incentives to 
                                        
2 Another name for this dilemma is sourcing problem and two corresponding solu-
tions are called insourcing and outsourcing. But actually the term outsourcing has an-
other narrower meaning (see the section Functional integration). 
 
find true cost-saving and performance-maximizing methods of operation. 
The firm can get access to full documentation of this department but there 
may be technological factors which create possibility of hiding some im-
portant pieces of information from the firm — immeasurable product, ex-
ternal factor, or professional knowledge. Thus internal department may 
generate higher costs than it could be possible with independent supplier in 
competitive environment.   
Which costs is higher? It depends on the particular situation. In every 
choice between market and integration the rational entrepreneur should 
compare these two kinds of threat and choose the profit maximizing solu-
tion.  
As we told before the technological landscape highly influences the size 
of these threats. Another important characteristic is the structure of this in-
termediate product market.  
1. If this is a monopsony (the resource is consumed only by this firm 
and may be produced by many suppliers) then this firm has great 
market power over the price. The competition between suppliers 
can remove all potential opportunism from their side which was 
described above but would they be interested in supplying goods 
to a monopsonist who can abuse its monopsonic power at any 
moment? 
2. If there is a monopoly (the resource is produced by the single firm 
but is consumed by many different firms in many different indus-
tries) all buyers may face a monopolistic price (a worst scenario of 
“explicit” opportunistic behavior) and also may be afraid to be ex-
ploited by the monopolist.   
3. If there is a competition (the resource is produced many firms and 
consumed by many firms) than competition among suppliers may 
again drive the price to average costs and there is nothing to care 
about. 
4. If there is a bilateral monopoly (the resource is produced by one 
firm and consumed only by one firm) this is the most favorable 
situation for mutual opportunistic behavior. Both parties may hide 
information about true costs and may try to hold up each other or 
abuse theirs market power in some other way.  
The general conclusion is that all types of monopolistic power lead to 
the vertical integration in the absence of other ways of removing opportun-
istic behavior (e.g. cultural norms, antitrust regulations and so on). Con-
trary, bilateral competition in most cases works out all problems with op-
portunistic behavior.    
Horizontal integration 
The dilemma of horizontal integration concerns decisions about includ-
ing the similar jobs (producers) from one stage of production into one firm. 
Here we have another set of factors which create two important non-
behavioral economic benefits. At first, horizontal integration means an in-
crease of scale of production which leads to the effect of economy of scale. 
Workers at one stage of production may enjoy common capital goods and 
share other indivisible costs (transportation, licensing, planning etc.). At 
second, the increase of production volume means the increase of market 
share and, consequently, market power. This may help to reduce costs, or 
increase the price — that is why horizontal integration is a highly attractive 
dimension of firm’s enlargement for the entrepreneur.  
May the entrepreneur expect to face some behavioral (opportunistic) is-
sues in horizontal integration? The problem of hold-up in using of one cap-
ital good is effectively removed by the integration but then there arise the  
problem of shirking at two levels. At the bottom level, if there are no spe-
cific products of every worker (e.g. at conveyor or blast furnace) the entre-
preneur faces the problem of team production — every worker may shirk 
at some extent. At the middle level the managers of integrated units feel 
themselves protected and do not care about cost reduction or productivity 
growth.   
What is higher — technological and market benefits or behavioral costs 
of horizontal integration? It seems that in horizontal case the former is al-
ways larger than the latter. The economy of scale and market power can 
increase the benefits so much that all corresponding behavioral costs of 
opportunism will be insignificant. This means that no entrepreneur has ev-
er lost from horizontal integration strategy and this dilemma should be al-
ways solved by the entrepreneur for the sake of integration. 
Then, as it follows from this analysis, we should expect the maximum 
degree of horizontal integration in the real economy. This expectation is 
fully supported by what we can see in the real world. Many industries are 
dominated by large companies with 20-30% of the market share and would 
be happy to grow even larger if they would not be restrained by antitrust 
authorities. Some industries are dominated by pure monopolists but these 
are natural monopolies which do not face the horizontal integration di-
lemma as it stated above. But some industries are highly competitive and 
consist from multiple producers with insignificant market share. Why does 
this exist? The answer is simple — there is no possibility of significant 
economy of scale in these industries. Actually, there is a potential of shar-
ing some indivisible costs in any industry, but in these industries the effect 
is so small that it is outweighed by the growth of opportunistic behavior at 
bottom level or in the managerial hierarchy. That is why this business is 
doomed to be small. A lot of services — taxi, hairdressing, cleaning, etc. 
— cannot be effectively delivered by the large horizontally integrated 
companies because there is no significant economy of scale but there is 
high probability of opportunistic behavior.  
Functional integration 
The third dilemma is a bit different from two previous ones because 
it is not about integration of various “segments” of production space (verti-
cal or horizontal). It exists in a different dimension. It deals with a choice 
about sourcing of some managerial or service function, e.g. marketing ser-
vice or human resource service. In a small firm all these managerial func-
tions are usually performed by the entrepreneur who does all marketing re-
search or hires and manages all personnel himself/herself. When the firm 
starts to grow the entrepreneur hires managers who become responsible for 
some specific managerial functions. In large firms these functions may be 
performed by separate functional departments. Nevertheless, this way of 
organization is not a single possible solution. Actually, any of these mana-
gerial services may be bought from an independent contractor. And the 
choice between internal and external production of some managerial func-
tion or production service comprises the functional integration dilemma.   
The solution to this dilemma may be fully explained with our basic 
set of arguments — behavioral strategies which determine potential losses 
from opportunism and technical factors which shape these behavioral strat-
egies.  
Internal solution. In many cases the external production of a manage-
rial function is quite unprofitable because it demands much specific in-
vestments and can lead to hold-up problems. Another reason is that to per-
form this function well the supplier has to process a lot of information but 
even a minor shirking here may bring large damages to firm’s perform-
ance. Consider, for example, strategic management or financial manage-
ment functions. Of course, some kind of analytical semi-standardized 
products (consultations, business plan development) may be bought from 
outside companies but the basic function of strategic management or finan-
cial management cannot be externally produced.  
External solution. However, in some cases some managerial function 
or a significant element of it may be transferred to external suppliers. The 
criterion for the transfer is a standardized character of these services. E.g. 
accounting services or some personnel administration services (keeping 
payroll or other paper work) may be transferred to the external provider 
with large experience and low costs. It is this transfer of some internal 
function to external provider which was initially called outsourcing before 
the term started to be applied to all external contracts.  
Related integration 
In previous three dilemmas we were talking about production of one 
particular product and various dimensions of integration in this single 
product space — vertical, horizontal and functional. But actually the entre-
preneur may follow another type of integration which is similar to horizon-
tal — integration of production of other products which are in some tech-
nological or marketing sense connected with the original product of the 
firm. For example, it may be integration in one firm of production of trucks 
and cars, or recording and concert businesses. So as these productions are 
close in some technological or market extent this type of integration is 
called related integration. 
What are economic and behavioral consequences of these integra-
tions? Economic benefits are similar to the effect of economy of scale be-
cause in production of these related products the firm may use the same 
capital goods — this effect is called economy of scope. This is the main 
positive effect from related integration because the integrated products are 
sold in different markets and this integration does not lead to a direct in-
crease of market power in any particular market. Nevertheless, market 
power may grow because of some indirect consequences (e. g. increase of 
financial resources of the firm, increase of brand value and so on). 
But there are behavioral costs — the potential shirking of new mana-
gerial structures which appear in the firm. The top managers who are re-
sponsible for production of new products do not have rights for residual in-
come and they will not work as hard as would independent entrepreneurs.  
The final solution of this dilemma depends on the proportion of econ-
omy of scale benefits and shirking costs of a new product which produc-
tion may be internalized by the firm. The size of economy of scale directly 
depends on the extent of relatedness of this new product to original product 
of the firm.   
One of the theories of related diversification was based on the excess 
factor capacities assumption (Caves, 1971; Gorecki, 1975; Penrose, 1959). 
This theory suggested that underused assets may lead firms to search for 
another ways of their application and the diversification is the best solution 
to this problem. This “historical” logic is fully compatible with the basic 
explanation proposed above. The theory of multiproduct firm proposed by 
Teece in 1982 was also based on similar analysis.  
Conglomerate integration 
This kind of integration supposes that production facilities which are be-
ing integrated are not connected technologically in any extent. For exam-
ple, the entrepreneur combines in one firm a tires factory and a dairy farm, 
or a bank and a tour operator.  
Why this may happen? The first and the very obvious answer — this is 
the simple enlargement logic (see Section I). New businesses bring new 
profit. A successful entrepreneur wants to own more businesses and enjoy 
more profit from all of them.  
Nevertheless, another relevant question arises here — why should we 
call these totally unrelated production facilities owned by one entrepreneur 
a firm? Essentially they are separate firms owned by one entrepreneur and 
there are no material arguments to treat them as one firm. The only reason 
to do this is the legal one. These businesses are called one firm because 
they formally belong to one legal person.  
This seems to be correct but actually it is not that simple. Let us remem-
ber our core definition of the firm — the firm is a relationship between 
employer who takes responsibility and residual income and employee who 
agrees to follow commands in return for fixed income. These relationships 
are still in place — the owner appoints top managers to all companies in 
the holding firm. And actually the legal status of holding does not have any 
serious meaning here. If these companies were owned by the entrepreneur 
individually (as separate legal entities) the nature of relationships between 
these companies would not changed. Essentially, we may say that if an en-
trepreneur owns several companies (combined into one legal person or 
standing alone) we may call this a holding or a conglomerate. 
So, the main function or main characteristic of conglomerate is that the 
entrepreneur appoints top managers of the companies. It is the entrepreneur 
who takes the responsibility and earns the residual income. But will this 
system be efficient if we take into account behavioral factors? The top 
managers of these companies do not have right to residual income of their 
companies so their motivation will be lower than motivation of top manag-
ers of similar companies who own these companies or where owners spend 
their full time for appointing and monitoring top managers and do not de-
tract to other businesses. Ceteris paribus, such companies with owning top 
managers should have higher performance than companies in the holding 
structures and should push the latter from the market.  
 What do we know about real conglomerates? There are some other hy-
potheses of conglomerate existence.  
Risk diversification. The first is that conglomerates are special struc-
tures which may allow reducing risk of investments. There is some logic 
behind this hypothesis but actually there is much better way of diversifica-
tion of risk — buying a portfolio of stocks with different characteristics. It 
is much more liquid and more stable in terms of risk investment.  
Strategic control. The conglomerate may be interested in strategic con-
trol of activity of all its companies to prevent undesired market behavior of 
them. This may be the case if these products are technologically independ-
ent (that is why this is a conglomerate), but the markets of these companies 
are somehow connected. For example, hotel, restaurant, and fitness center 
in a resort are technologically unrelated but provide services for the same 
captive audience. Any of these businesses may behave opportunistically 
and to charge higher than average prices for its services because the de-
mand of captive audience is relatively inelastic. This would be direct trans-
fer of some portion of aggregate demand of this audience to this opportun-
istic business, that is why a holding company which owns all three busi-
nesses (hotel, restaurant and fitness center) may be more efficient in this 
case. The similar question is why Russian oligarchs buy newspapers and 
radio and TV channels?  
Market power. Any company inside the holding is more protected 
against the competition on its particular market because in case of unfavor-
able market situation (weak demand or intensive price competition) other 
companies of the conglomerate may provide the troubled company with 
funds to sustain the crisis. This may even help to conduct such market 
strategy as predatory pricing.3  
Opportunistic behavior. However, not all explanations of conglomerate 
are based on the optimality assumption. Some versions of their existence 
assume quite opposite — the conglomerates are a sort of inefficient conse-
quences of badly structured contracts with top managers. If top managers 
of the conglomerate are rewarded on the base of market capitalization of 
their company than they are interested in enlargement of the company by 
any means and if the conglomerate has free resources or can attract credit 
or equity financing the latter is used to enlarge the company and to get bo-
nuses or stock options (let us remember the pump-and-dump strategy and 
its classic application by Enron managers). This hypothesis was proposed 
by Mueller (1969) who tried to explain the surprisingly high wave of con-
glomerate M&A in the 1960s. Another version of this hypothesis was 
shaped by Jensen (1986) who proposed a “free-cash-flow” explanation of 
diversification.  
Failing firm/industry. Another explanation of conglomerate appearance 
is based on the concept of failing firm or failing industry which assumes 
that a firm in the shrinking industry may try to buy a new firm in a growing 
                                        
3 This threat was noticed by antitrust authorities as far as 1940s (Williamson, 1985). 
market to stay in business in the long run. This is just a strategy of transfer-
ring all residual resources into another business. The empirical test of 56 
conglomerate M&A in 1966-69 in US did not support this hypothesis 
(Mueller 1969). 
Some empirical research of conglomerate profitability showed that they 
have a bit higher return than independent companies (Econtal Research 
1969, Kumps 1975) but other researchers did not find support for this ob-
servation (Utton, 1969).  
Another research was directed to compare return of conglomerates and 
independent companies during various stages of economic cycle (Hill, 
1983). It was found that during the boom in financial markets of 1966-
1969 the profitability of conglomerates was much better than independent 
companies but during the depression of 1969-1971 it was much lower. This 
fact may lead us to two following conclusions. First, conglomerates are 
much more difficult to evaluate that is why they become an object of fi-
nancial speculations and grow higher and fall lower than independent 
companies. Second, the average return of conglomerates is the same as of 
independent companies and there are no significant economic benefits of 
this type of the firm. 
 
* * * 
 These are all essential elements of the general theory of the firm. The 
firm is the relationships between employer and employee about risk and 
income distribution. Managerial hierarchy is only an administrative tool 
and does not constitute the firm. The size of the firm is determined by 
technological factors which, from one side, create various economics of 
scale and scope, and from the other side, create possibilities for opportunis-
tic behaviour. All choices about firm’s boundaries may be represented as 
five types of integration dilemmas.  
 Nothing principally different may be added to this theory. There are 
several developments of this theory which we discuss in the next section 
but essentially, as you will see in the next section, they do not constitute a 
new theory. They only specify and emphasize some important elements of 
the same core theory. 
III. EXTENSIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
In this section we will discuss all major approaches to the theory of the 
firm in their chronological order and will try to demonstrate that they are 
useful extensions and interpretations of the core theory which do not 
change the basic premise of it but shed some additional light to important 
sides of firms’ reality. At first, we will make a short review of the core 
theory development. 
A short history of the core theory 
For a long time there was no theory of the firm in the economic sci-
ence.  In 19th century actually there were no large managerial hierarchies 
which began to appear only in the middle of the century in railroads and in 
the end of the century in the manufacturing industry. In the classic political 
economy the firm was associated with the capitalist — a rich man owning 
the means of production and able to hire the working people to produce 
goods and sell them for profit. The capital resources necessary for buying 
machines and roundabout capital — this was the key factor of this system. 
The main efforts of economists in 19th century were directed to explaining 
prices, wages, rents and profits in this economy.  In the beginning of the 
20th century they were successfully crowned with foundation of microeco-
nomics and this fruitful methodology of supply and demand analysis for 
several decades kept the attention of economists’ community. 
Interestingly, the first insight about the nature of the firm was grown 
out of this price theory discourse. Although all factors’ incomes — wages 
and rents — were successfully explained through supply and demand but 
the last and the most mysterious one — profit — remained unclear. The 
theory of profit for a long time remained one of the least explored and un-
derstood area of microeconomics. There was Marxian theory of exploita-
tion, Nassau Senior’s abstinence theory, special-type-of-labour theories 
(from Mill to Marshall), and so on.  
The work Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921) by Frank Knight was an 
attempt to answer this century old problem. Knight introduced the impor-
tant distinction between risk and uncertainty and suggested that the func-
tion of the entrepreneur is to take decisions under uncertainty which are 
costly and may lead to losses. That is why the entrepreneur takes this risk 
and allows all other people to be “employees” and get a risk-free “wage” 
while he/she gets the right to manage their labour and to appropriate all re-
sidual income which is called “profit”. This uncertainty-based distinction 
between employer and employee is still the key starting point of the gen-
eral theory of the firm which is proposed in this paper. 
The first explicit question about the nature of the firm was asked by 
Ronald Coase (1937). He rejected the explanation of Knight and claimed 
that the specialist in analyzing and taking decisions under uncertainty may 
be hired through the contract and this fact cannot be the reason of the 
firm’s existence. The true reason for this is that coordination of producers 
inside the firm is less costly than the coordination of them through the 
market.  
We can see that the main difference between Knight and Coase was 
that the former explained the existence of the firm as employer-employee 
relationships in questions of taking responsibility but the latter explained 
the firms as a better coordination effect comparing to market. Nevertheless, 
these are not two different explanations but one explanation in different 
words stressing different sides of one coin. 
With growth of division of labour some parts of production space de-
mand to be planned and coordinated by someone who understands the pro-
duction purpose and has the wish to serve this function. The usual coordi-
nation mechanism of market economy — the markets — do not work here 
because at this stages of vertical and functional division of labour the in-
termediary products of individual workers are so specific (have so narrow 
purpose) or changeable that there are no markets at all, or if you wish, 
there is a complete market failure for these products. These intermediary 
products have value only in this particular project (firm) that is why the 
originator of this project — the entrepreneur — should take all responsi-
bilities for planning and implementing the project and to buy the consent of 
individual workers to perform these specific functions for a guaranteed 
wage.4  
The fundamental contribution of Coase was the suggestion of a new 
discourse — comparisons of firms and markets as alternative organiza-
tional forms — and providing a general hypothesis that the best form 
should have less transaction costs. Nevertheless, his explanation of the fac-
tors which determine transaction costs was very superficial — he stated 
that inside the firm 1) it is easier to get information about prices, 2) the 
number of contracts is smaller and 3) there could be tax advantages. The 
last two arguments cannot be taken seriously5 but the first one was a useful 
step in the right direction. He could not provide the main instruments for 
this journey — the concept of opportunistic behavior and structural factors 
                                        
4 Some latest attempts to refine the nature of the firm emphasize the same idea — 
the impossibility to realize the entrepreneur’s visions and innovations without creating 
a firm (Witt 2007, Zander 2007, Pitelis, Teece, 2009). Some researchers even talk 
about special entrepreneurial theory of the firm (e.g. Tambovtsev 2010), but this is just 
the old Knightian idea interpreted for some special cases (e.g. risky innovations). 
5 There are no strong arguments that there will be fewer contracts inside the firm. 
The contracts inside the firm may have longer term but the same may be true about 
market contracts. Tax advantages are also a secondary and conditioned factor which 
can make some influence but cannot explain the nature of the firm.  
which lead to this behavior — but it would be too naïve to think that it was 
possible to make all these discoveries in one paper. 
The later progress of this theory went right in this direction — under-
standing the fundamental reasons why firms may be cheaper than markets.  
After some period of ignorance of this topic several authors started to pro-
pose various ideas for a new understanding of the firm. 
In 1971 Oliver Williamson published his first paper on vertical integra-
tion where he tried to find realistic explanations for replacing the market 
with the firm. In this paper the terms like contract incompleteness, moral 
hazard (borrowed from Arrow’s 1969 paper), strategic misrepresentation 
risk, and internalization of market exchange were introduced into analysis 
to show how market failure may lead to vertical integration as a cost-
efficient solution.  
In 1972 Alchian and Demsetz proposed their version of the existence 
of the firm which was based on the team production concept. This concept 
refers to various types of collective production activity where there is no 
individual product of every member but the joint product of the team and it 
is easy to shirk in some extent. That is why there is the metering problem 
— the task of measuring individual contributions — and this problem may 
be effectively sold only by the monitor who has right for all residual in-
come (i.e. has incentives not shirk by himself/herself). This is where the 
idea of shirking first enters the analysis of the firm. In 1976 Jensen and 
Meckling demonstrated that this story was not limited only to the team 
production. 
In 1978 Klein, Crawford and Alchian proposed the idea of the specific 
asset which is created after the contract is made and opens window for 
hold-up behavior when the other party demands for changing terms of the 
contract and exploits the vulnerability of the specific asset owner.6 A for-
mal interpretation “explicitly non-contractible investments” was developed 
later by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). 
In 1985 Williamson incorporated all types of opportunistic factors (in-
cluding shirking factors which were clearly absent from his previous anal-
ysis) in his book Economic Institutions of Capitalism which became the 
most comprehensive description of various cases of choice between the 
market and the firm. 
                                        
6 Interestingly, that although this concept become one of the main factor in expla-
nation of vertical integration Coase rejected to admit its importance and took the firm 
position that any hold-up problems may be ruled out through long-term contracts ( ). 
The long and sad discussion with Klein could not change his position. 
 
One of the basic claims in Alchian and Demsetz (1972) was that the 
firm should be considered as a nexus of contracts. This was supported by 
the methodologically individualist notion that the firm is not an individual 
and we should not talk about firm’s decisions or firm’s strategy. This idea   
received the support in further research, and Fama (1980) and Cheung 
(1983) even called for an abandonment of the concepts of "the entrepre-
neur" and "the firm". This suggestion may seem correct at the first sight 
because any hierarchy may be seen as a bundle of contracts. Nevertheless, 
it is inferior from our core theory’s view. The firm is the relationship be-
tween the entrepreneur and the employees which may be, of course, called 
a “nexus of contracts” but this metaphor does not reflect the essence of this 
relationship — the distribution of risks and responsibilities.   
Sociological theories 
One of the first alternative understandings of the firm had been devel-
oped by the closest neighbor of economics in social science family — or-
ganizational theory which demonstrated very active growth in 1960s and 
1970s.7  
One of the major approaches there was the contingency theory which 
suggested the dependency of the organizational structure from the envi-
ronmental and technological factors.8 Actually, this is exactly the idea be-
hind the theory described in the previous sections (i.e. the general theory of 
the firms is a contingency theory). The main difference in the methods and 
rhetoric of two literatures are: 1) the organizational theory was focused not 
only on the firms but also all kinds of governmental and private organiza-
tions, 2) the organizational theory was developed by the social scientists 
who was not so heavily based on the methodological individualism and the 
maximization choice, and were used to a less rigor analysis. That is why 
the frameworks of the organizational theory were much more abstract and 
diverse than the approach of the economic theory of the firm.9  
For example, Woodward (1958) argued that organizational structure 
(span of control, centralization of authority, and the formalization of rules 
                                        
7 For a more general review see Klemina (2009). 
8 The previous theories of organizational structure — Weber's bureaucracy theory 
and Taylor's scientific management — searched an ideal organization form and ne-
glected the influence of the situational factors. 
9 Another important feature of this literature was that it was focused mostly on the 
structure and even considered the size of the firm as an independent variable of inter-
nal environment which influenced the structure. 
   
 
and procedures) highly depended on the technology. Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1967) stated that in complex environments the organization needed to de-
velop separate departments to confront differing environmental segments. 
Blau (1972) suggested that the size of organization depends on the homo-
geneity of tasks which allows extracting benefits from common admini-
stration (more common tasks lead to a large size). Heterogeneity of tasks 
demands for differentiation in administration.  
An important book was published by Thompson (1967) who made 
many specific observations and generalizations about organizations which, 
in our terms, may be understood as an approach for describing the techno-
logical landscape (see the section I). For example, Thompson identified 
three general types of interdependence among unit personnel and organiza-
tional units: pooled, sequential, and reciprocal;10 three types of coordina-
tion: standardized, planned, and mutual adjustment;11 three general types 
of task processes: long-linked, mediating, and intensive,12 and so on. The 
combination of these factors should be accounted for if we wish to under-
stand and explain particular organization. These classifications were later 
used by some proponents of contingency theory in their analysis. It is clear 
that their role is very similar to our technological factors — they determine 
the possibilities for opportunism. And it seems that the general theory of 
the firm could gain some new insights from Thompsons’ framework. 
The contingency approach was actively criticized by the paradigm of 
strategic choice (Child 1972) which holds that there is much freedom in 
the choice of organizational form and, actually, the organization does not 
simply adjust its behavior to the environment but may actively participate 
in adjusting the environment to its needs (through a political process). To 
better understand this contradiction between two theories we should make 
                                        
10 In pooled interdependence, each team member or unit makes a specific contri-
bution to the outcome by adding its personal knowledge or work. In sequential inter-
dependence the product of one member or unit depends upon the product of another. 
In reciprocal interdependence, members or units supply each other with some re-
sources. 
11 Under standardization there are established rules for how people should coordi-
nate their activity. Under planning there are not such rules because tasks are not stan-
dard, therefore team members must plan their coordination processes. Under mutual 
adjustment the planning is also impossible and then constant communication is re-
quired to make sure that activities are performed with minimal confusion and maxi-
mum benefit.
12 Long-linked processes require the completion of various task activities over 
time (e.g. assembly line). Mediating processes link together individuals or groups that 
want to be interdependent for their mutual benefit (e.g. the broker links buyers and sel-
lers). In intensive processes the next operation is dependent on the effects of earlier 
operations (e.g. military operations).
two observations. First, from the point of methodological individualism 
and maximization paradigm there are no contradictions at all — the strate-
gic choice should be a choice of the most profitable structure for a given 
technological landscape. Otherwise, how could we name this strategic 
choice rational? Second, the task of adjustment of environment is possible 
only if we talk about adjustment of some institutions or political structure 
(it is hardly possible to adjust the technology). Third, this task is available 
only for large organizations and the “strategic” choice of small organiza-
tions should be fully contingent on the environmental conditions. 
Another important approach in the organizational theory was the re-
source dependency paradigm originally exposed by Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) and focused on various power relationships between organizations 
which are determined by the fact that one company depends in some re-
sources from other organizations. One strategy of removing this depend-
ency was constraints absorption, or, strictly speaking, mergers and acquisi-
tions. It is not hard to notice that this hypothesis is based on the same idea 
as all our integration dilemmas do — dependency (i.e. market power) cre-
ates possibilities for opportunistic behavior and may be removed by verti-
cal integration.  
This paradigm caused large number of theoretical and empirical re-
search. For example, Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) studied the data on in-
ter-industry mergers and acquisitions among U.S. public companies in the 
period 1985–2000 and found that, while mutual dependence was a key 
driver of mergers and acquisitions, power imbalance acted as an obstacle to 
their formation. This finding is also fully compatible with the general the-
ory of the firm view: only bilateral monopoly is a guaranteed cause of con-
tractual problems, but when there is a competition only at one side of the 
market the other side may enjoy the fruits of its privileged position without 
any mergers. This party even should not integrate as it is argued by the re-
source-base view (see the next section), because it can extract long-term 
rents only at the monopolized stages of the value chain. 
The last concept in the organizational theory which we need to mention 
here — institutional isomorphism — is a more sociological one because it 
is based on the traditional sociological idea that behavior of every social 
actor depends on social norms and every actor seeks to be legitimate in the 
eyes of his/her community. This concept was initially outlined by Meyer 
and  Rowen (1977) who noticed that there are some generally accepted 
myths about organizations in the society and many decisions about organ-
izational design are taken ceremoniously in order to gain or maintain le-
gitimacy in the institutional environment instead of real consideration of 
costs and benefits. Dimaggio and Powell (1983) developed this thought 
further and proposed the idea of isomorphism — the homogeneity of or-
ganizational structures appeared as a result of various institutional pres-
sures. Coercive pressure comes from demands of regulatory or more pow-
erful organizations. Mimetic pressure is the desire to copy successful forms 
under high uncertainty. Normative pressure is generated by the similar atti-
tudes and approaches brought into the firm by professionals from the same 
educational institutions. 
This approach which is also called new institutionalism in sociology 
usually is often represented as an alternative explanation of organizational 
choice contradicting new institutional economics with its transaction costs 
analysis. The firms do not think about transaction costs, they want to be le-
gitimate and choose the commonly accepted organizational forms and in-
stitutions.  
Nevertheless, there is no contradiction between these approaches. To 
understand this we should ask ourselves: where are commonly accepted 
organizational forms and institutions come from? They cannot be copied 
from nowhere and they cannot be arbitrary. Instead of this it is reasonable 
to assume that they were found by some trial and error process in the past 
as the most efficient forms with minimum transaction costs but after that 
they become spread in the organizational community by simple copying of 
the best practices. In other words, both approaches answer different ques-
tions: new institutional economics explains why the commonly accepted 
organizational forms appeared and new institutionalism in sociology de-
scribes the process how this forms spread in the community.  
Summarizing all this, we can notice that sociological theories had not 
proposed any real alternatives to the economic explanation of the firm. The 
contingency theory and resource dependency theory restated the same 
ideas but only in other terms and rhetoric (different interpretation), and in-
stitutional isomorphism was focused on the other aspect of the choice — 
mechanism of spread of optimal forms in the organizational community 
(important addition to the general theory of the firm which does not un-
dermine its basic principles). 
Resource-based view 
In 1980s the strategic management literature produced a new approach 
to find a sustainable source of competitive advantages (Wernerfeld 1984, 
Rumelt 1984, Barney 1986, Diericx Cool 1989). This approach supposed 
that only rare valuable resources which cannot be reproduced by competi-
tors may be used to earn higher than average rents in the long run. The ap-
proach was called resource-based view (RBV) and soon became a very 
popular theory and a major alternative to an older Porterian positioning 
framework. The key concept of this approach was the idea of valuable, 
rare, inimitable, non-substitutable (VRIN) resources (Barney 1991). 
Although the RBV theory is a managerial approach which main pur-
pose is to give some advice to managers how to run their companies it may 
have an important implication for the positive theory of the firm. What im-
plications? Is this a new theory of the firm or just a comment to some ex-
isting theories?    
The first attempt to answer this question was undertook by Conner 
(1991) who compared RBV with five established theories of the firm (per-
fect competition model, Bain's industrial organization theory, Schumpete-
rian and Chicago responses, and transaction cost theory).  She suggested 
that RBV both incorporates and rejects at least one central feature of each 
of these theories and generally may be understood as a new theory of the 
firm which assumes it own rationale for firm’s existence independently 
from opportunism considerations. This rationale is the ability of the firm to 
create unique productive bundles of resources which cannot be reproduced 
in arm’s length transactions and in other firms. As an example Conner used 
the imaginary situation with tacit knowledge which can be used in an inte-
grated firm but not in contract relationships. This was the weakest point in 
Conner’s argumentation — this valid example with knowledge resource  
was too narrow for the general RBV approach and would be more appro-
priate in the knowledge-based views on the firm (see the section on KBV 
theories below).  
The question may be answered on the basis of the proposed general 
theory of the firm. The RBV represents a modification of the basic en-
largement logic (the bigger the better) of this theory: it is unreasonable to 
add to the firm competitive sectors because there is no profit in these sec-
tors in the long run. It has sense to add only sectors with some market pow-
er. Further, it leads to a modification of the logic behind all five integration 
dilemmas.  
For example, when the entrepreneur considers the dilemma of vertical 
integration he/she should take into account not only the potential opportun-
ism of the supplier or the customer but also if the latter has some VRIN re-
sources. Does this change the solution of the dilemma? Yes, if the re-
sources are different, because in the case of homogenous resources all an-
swers are already given by the original logic — if there is competition 
among suppliers the integration does not make sense. But if we assume 
that resources are different then all suppliers have different profits (or Ri-
cardian rents) and for the entrepreneur it makes sense to integrate those 
suppliers who possesses those VRIN resources which bring these rents.  
If we consider the horizontal integration dilemma taking into account 
the heterogeneity of resources RBV arguments also may modify the solu-
tion. The firm gets some gain from economy of scale but it may get even 
more gain if it integrates the resources with good VRIN characteristics. 
E.g. if the company is allowed to have only 30% of market share and, con-
sequently, may own only 30% of all production facilities it is much better 
to have the best VRIN resources in these 30% of production facilities and 
therefore increase the size of profit (to add some Ricardian rents to it).  
The same argumentation may be build in the case of related integra-
tion — presence of VRIN resources in the integrated sector enhances the 
arguments for integration (this topic was analyzed by Teece, 1980, 1982). 
It seems that in the case of conglomerate integration the importance 
of RBV arguments reaches its maximum because in this case there is a def-
icit for all other arguments. Perhaps, the RBV theory of conglomerates is 
one of the most viable and relevant explanation of successful conglomer-
ates as the collection of independent businesses based on various VRIN re-
sources.  
The next question is if these resources may lose these VRIN charac-
teristics after the integration. First, it certainly may and will happen if these 
VRIN characteristic are based on human capital (e.g. managerial or inno-
vative skills and talents) which does not bring stable return in all circum-
stances. A hostile takeover or unwise management after integration may 
eliminate the favorable environment for fruitful functioning of these re-
sources. Second, the size of these rents may be comparable with costs of 
opportunistic behavior of integrated firm and in this case the integration 
strategy becomes doubtful. But if the VRIN characteristics are based on 
“hard” physical characteristics of resources and cannot be lost even with 
not very wise management then the RBV logic may significantly change 
the solution of vertical dilemma integration. 
Therefore, RBV theory of the firms brings into analysis the heteroge-
neity of resources which modify solutions of integration dilemmas pro-
vided by the core theory. Nevertheless, the basic principles of the core the-
ory remain unchanged. 
Dynamic capabilities approach 
In 1990s another version of RBV was proposed by several authors 
(Teece et al., 1990). This version assumed that the most important source 
of competitive advantage is not some particular resources but dynamic ca-
pabilities of the firm — ability to continuously create new productive com-
binations of material and non-material resources. The key logic behind this 
approach was that all resource-based advantages tend to vanish with time 
due to natural forces as well as competitive efforts of other companies. 
That is why the only true source of sustainable long term competitive ad-
vantage may be the capability of a higher order — the capability to find 
new VRIN resources and to create new advantageous combinations of 
them.  
The differences between two versions of RBV theory were well sum-
marized by Katkalo (2006): the first approach is a static one, the value of 
resources are created externally, and they earn Ricardian rents; the second 
approach is a dynamic one, the value of resources is created internally and 
the rents are Schumpeterian.  
What implications may follow from this approach to the theory of the 
firm? The first idea is that the entrepreneur itself is one of the most valu-
able resources and the presence of a good entrepreneur in the firm is one of 
the major factors for sustainable comparative advantages and larger rents. 
But does this theory have some influence on the size of the firm? Does it 
change the solution to integration dilemmas? We can say that the better 
dynamic capabilities of the entrepreneur (the firm) the better decisions will 
be found for all integration dilemmas — the firm will have the most profit-
able shape of its boundaries. But the dynamic capabilities concept cannot 
give us any additional arguments for analysis of this issue. This fact re-
flects the general methodological problem of the dynamic capabilities con-
cept — this is a very general characteristic of high level of abstraction 
which can be used for a broad philosophical discourse but is hardly appli-
cable to non-tautological explanation of real choices of integration dilem-
mas and other issues in the positive theory of the firm. 
Knowledge-based view 
Several approaches in strategic management and theory of the firm lit-
erature stressed the importance of knowledge as a key factor determining 
competitive advantages and firms’ structures. This analysis may be under-
stood (and often positioned) as an extension to the resource-based ap-
proach though historically it started to develop somewhat earlier and in 
various parallel traditions of thought. The common idea of all these ap-
proaches that the firm is not just a bundle of resources it contains some-
thing else — some collective knowledge and abilities to act together which 
were accumulated during development of the firm and will be lost if the 
firm ceases to exists.13  
                                        
13 The question about the “place” where this collective knowledge reside — only 
in people or somewhere else in the firm (see the discussion in Tambovtsev, 2010) — is 
not important. What is important is that this collective knowledge is productive only 
until these people stay together. And similar team of people hired individually from 
the market will not have the same productivity immediately because they need time to 
Penrose (1959) was the first to propose a picture of the firm as a pool 
of intangible resources and stressed that the managerial team is not just a 
sum of managers but some common experience and skills.  
The evolutionary theory of the firm by Nelson and Winter (1982) was 
also based on a similar idea that some implicit routines plays role of “skills 
of an organization” and define its competitive advantages.  
The theory of multiproduct firm proposed by Teece in 1982 admitted 
that one of the jointly used factors may be special knowledge of the firm 
— this was an obvious step toward knowledge based view of the firm.  
The idea of firm’s competencies was introduced into strategy literature 
by Hamel and Prahalad (1990) and they also understood by this concept 
something supra-personal, existing in the community14, though they did 
not make any implications to the theory of the firm. 
These implications were provided by Kogut and Zander (1992) who 
proposed a new knowledge-based view of the firm as a bearer of tacit, so-
cial, and path-dependent organizational knowledge. The knowledge may 
be produced and reproduced in a social setting, and it is inseparable from 
this setting, and is not fully reducible to individuals. That is a fundamental 
reason for existence of the firm. 
Another version of competency theory of the firm was explicitly (and 
independently from Kogut and Sander) formulated by Foss (1993) who 
proposed it as an alternative to the contractual theory. Two main issues of 
the theory of the firm — its existence (nature) and its boundaries — may 
be answered with the help of this theory. The existence of the firm is ex-
plained by the unique competency of the entrepreneur who “can sell his 
services through a contractual relationship, or start a firm” (p. 136). The 
boundaries of the firm are determined by the fact that competencies of the 
firm allow producing efficiently “more of the same” and “more of some-
thing closely related” and to do vertical integration or diversification (simi-
lar to the argument of excess capacity, see the section on related diversifi-
cation). 
However, in 1996 Foss published a paper with criticism of Conner 
(1991) and Kogut and Zander (1992) approaches to KBV theory as an in-
dependent argument of existence of the firm and implicitly rejected his 
own previous position on that issue. He criticized these authors for techno-
logically determinism (see the footnote in the section on technological fac-
tors above) and stated that knowledge-based arguments are necessary but 
                                                                                                                         
build a similar collective knowledge inside their team. The more complex knowledge, 
the longer time. 
14 “Collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse 
production skills and integrate multiple streams of technology" (p. 82). 
not sufficient for the existence of the firm. It is impossible to explain the 
firm without accounting for opportunistic behavior.15
Another version of the knowledge-based view of the firm was sug-
gested by Grant (1996) — the firm was seen also as an institution for inte-
gration of knowledge but its main task was not creation of new knowledge 
but facilitating the process of application on knowledge residing in indi-
viduals. In a more recent research (Almeida, Song, Grant, 2002) he tried to 
show that firms do better in questions of international innovative activity 
than alliances and market contracts. 
Therefore, many researchers stressed the importance of the firm as a 
knowledge managing organization. Does this change our core theory as-
sumptions?  
If we try to relate this knowledge-based view to the core theory of the 
firm from the first two sections, we may see that the former is an important 
extension of the latter which does not change its basic arguments but draws 
our attention to some specific cases. Knowledge and competencies which 
exist in the firm may be understood as a joint capital good, which is pro-
duced inside the firm and used for increasing of the firm’s performance. 
Contractual problems do not allow producing this capital good through 
market that is why it should be developed and maintained inside the firm.  
It is a useful addition to the spectrum of cases but this addition again does 
not make a revolution in the core theory. At least because there are many 
other types of firms which are not built around some team of knowledge 
workers or knowledge-intensive production. Consider barbershop or fast 
food restaurant, transportation or warehousing companies — usually they 
do not demand for some specific knowledge and do not lead to creation of 
special bundle of competencies which are not known in the market.  
Closed vs. open innovations 
In the previous approach the necessity to build and use knowledge de-
manded creation of the firm and vertical integration. Besides, there is an-
other important problem of using knowledge which is also connected with 
                                        
15 Ironically enough, for justification of that claim Foss used the same thought ex-
periment which was used previously in his 1993 paper to proof his previous position. 
He asked the reader to imagine a society with absolutely moral people where no firms 
should exist accordingly to the contractual perspective but where stillsome firms and 
vertical integration may be found because of accumulated competences. However, in 
the 1996 paper Foss suggested that without opportunistic threats all these collabora-
tions could be conducted through market contracts and the competency theory is not 
enough.  Did he ever admit this self-contradiction? 
 
the problem of opportunism — the problem of protection of firm’s innova-
tions which once made may be leaked to the market and used by all other 
companies. In this case the firm may lose the opportunity to get reward for 
its investments in creating this knowledge. So, when a firm prepares to 
make some innovations it must think off some mechanism to prevent leak-
ages and free-riding of other companies. A contractual solution to these is-
sues may be rather expensive and technically unachievable that is why ver-
tical integration again becomes a solution. That is why a traditional ap-
proach to creation and protection of innovations supposes the maximum 
degree of vertical integration in innovative process.  
Nevertheless, as we know from our core theory of the firm there may 
be too much integration. Large companies lose efficiency because of shirk-
ing problems which accumulate at all levels of managerial hierarchies and 
lead to inefficient decisions which outweigh the benefits of integration.  
As a response for these problems a new alternative concept of open in-
novations (Chesbrough 2003, 2006) appeared admitting that it is not neces-
sary to embed the entire innovative process under one organization’s 
boundaries and that innovations could be done much faster and more effec-
tive by several independent market players cooperating through market 
contracts and in open-source environment. Large companies very often ex-
perience not-invented-here or not-sold-here syndromes which deprive 
them from the power of other people’s ideas and potential. On the contrary, 
companies should make their innovations open to other companies and 
more actively use innovations of others to create higher value.  
Of course, the company may be rewarded for its innovations only if it 
could capture some amount of the created value through selling its prod-
ucts or patents and licenses to other companies. This problem creates a 
challenge for the entrepreneurs and managers — to find organizational, 
marketing and contractual strategies which may help to capture some value 
from their innovations. 
We may see that strictly speaking the theory of open innovations and 
the KBV of the firm are contradictory to each other because the latter de-
mands for expanding and the former for contracting of organizational 
boundaries. But their arguments have various implications for different in-
tegration dilemmas and in different technological structures.   
For example, if we talk about horizontal integration, then the KBV 
theory cannot provide any strong arguments for integration but the open 
innovation theory which holds that “not all smart people work here” admits 
that innovation process goes much faster if being organized between inde-
pendent competing teams that inside one administrative organization. Dis-
ruptive innovations (Christensen 2003) cannot take place if the production 
will be fully horizontally integrated because no rational firm will agree to 
disrupt its own business. 
If we take vertical or functional integration the knowledge issue may 
play an important role in the choice of organizational form. Suppliers of 
various components or some managerial services (e. g. marketing or adver-
tising) may need some specific knowledge about firm’s operations but it 
does not mean that they should be always integrated with the firm. The 
choice depends on three factors: the codifiability of knowledge, the mar-
ketability of the intermediate product or service, and the necessity to stimu-
late innovativeness in the service providers. E.g. the development of a third 
generation of mobile systems was organized by Ericsson through distrib-
uted development scheme. The success of this scheme was founded on two 
elements — use of an “integration centric engineering process” to plan and 
coordinate independent teams of developers and using of a “global infor-
mation system” for sharing the knowledge between project participants 
(Taxén 2006). 
As we have seen from these examples the KBV theory and the open 
innovation theory serve as complementary arguments for the explanation 
of the boundaries of the firm and there comparative relevance depends on 
the technological characteristics of the industry.  
CSR and stakeholders views 
In 1950s the society began to think more and more often about the 
power of large corporations and its potential abuse. In 1953 Howard Bo-
wen published the book Social Responsibilities of the Businessmen which 
expressed the idea that business is responsible before the society and 
should meet society’s expectations about its activities. Hence the concept 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) was born and became the topic of 
vast explorations in the next decades. In 1984 it was enhanced with the 
concept of stakeholders — “any group or individual who can affect, or is 
affected by, the achievement of a corporation's purpose" (Freeman, 1984). 
The CSR and stakeholder perspective was explored quite actively and one 
of intellectual products of these explorations was some new implications 
for the theory of the firm. 
First, it was the fundamental idea that the management of the firm is 
responsible not only to owners (entrepreneurs) but to the whole society (all 
stakeholders). This means that we can talk about opportunistic behavior of 
the manager not only concerning the owners but all other stakeholders who 
now may also be considers as the manager’s principals. Relationship be-
tween every stakeholder and the firm is actually a contract and there may 
be a lot of possibilities of opportunism in these contracts. E.g. the presence 
of specific asset in one of these contracts may create vulnerability of that 
stakeholder or the firm. How to create the governance mechanism to re-
move this vulnerability?  
One of the first answers to this new agenda was given by Oliver Wil-
liamson (1984) who suggested that this governance mechanism may be bi-
lateral safeguards system (e.g. effective contract between the firm and the 
stakeholder) or general safeguard system (introduction of the stakeholder’s 
representatives into the board of directors, e.g. employees or suppliers). 
This paper cause a reaction of the founder of stakeholder theory who pub-
lished the paper (Freeman Evan 1990) developing this line of analysis and 
arguing that actually all stakeholders may have specific assets in relations 
with the firm and therefore should be invited to the board of directors to 
prevent opportunistic behavior of the firm. Accordingly, as Freeman and 
Evan wrote, it has sense to change the notion of the firm as nexus of con-
tracts and replace it with a framework of “a series of multilateral contracts 
among stakeholders.” 
The similar thought was developed by Ruf et al. (2001) who tried to in-
troduce the contract theory into the stakeholder analysis, arguing that “the 
firms that satisfy stakeholder demands or accurately signal their willing-
ness to cooperate can often avoid higher costs that result from more for-
malized contractual compliance mechanisms (e.g. government regulation, 
union contracts)". Therefore, the good CSR policies may reduce transac-
tion costs in contracting with various stakeholders. 
However, this stakeholder view of the firm caused some skepticism 
among theoreticians who used to deal with a more rigor analysis. Jensen 
(2002) criticized the stakeholder view of the firm as non-productive be-
cause the responsibility of manager before many principals is much harder 
to measure than simple one-purpose wealth maximization.16 So, he pro-
posed to use stakeholder theory only as “enlightened wealth maximization” 
where all relationships with stakeholders are important only as long-term 
drivers of firm’s profitability.  
Later attempts to find some additional generalizations (Kristoffersen, 
Gerrans, Clark-Murphy 2005) were not very productive. 
In 2002 there was another development of stakeholder theory in the 
book of J. Post, L. Preston and S. Sachs who proposed a new theory of ex-
tended corporation. This concept was similar to the notion of extended 
family which includes the nuclear family (husband, wife and their chil-
dren) plus all their more or less close relatives (spouses of children, cous-
                                        
16 Similarly, he totally dismissed the Balanced Scorecard approached as a descrip-
tive analysis which does not allow assessing the quality of manager’s job because 
there is no score.  
ins, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews etc.). In 1990s the similar term “ex-
tended enterprise” appeared in Chrysler Corporation, where it meant an al-
liance of the company and its suppliers exchanging with information and 
management practices. For Chrysler it was a forced move in the competi-
tive pressure to cut costs. (Later the term became a synonym for “supply 
chain”.) Post, Preston and Sachs enlarged the concept of “extended enter-
prise” and included into it not only the suppliers but all internal and exter-
nal stakeholders.17 The key idea was that the long-term survival and suc-
cess of a firm is determined by its ability to establish and maintain rela-
tionships within its entire network of stakeholders. Therefore it is relation-
ships rather than transactions that are the ultimate sources of organiza-
tional wealth. The latter idea — the organizational wealth — was another 
key concept in this framework embracing not only material assets and non-
material know-how but also good relationships with stakeholders which 
may serve as a VRIN resource leading to competitive advantages.  
What meaning does this theory have to our general theory of the firm? 
Actually, this stakeholder theory of the firm does not give as any new an-
swers to basic questions of the theory of the firm — nature, size, structure 
— and in this sense it is not a theory of the firm at all. Nevertheless its ba-
sic idea — relationships instead of contracts — may have some important 
implications to our general theory of the firm. However, this idea was 
much better explored and developed by another discipline — relationship 
marketing — which will be discussed in next two sections. 
Supply chain management  
The contract theory (or transactional cost economics) which is a part of 
economic theory has two counterparts in the domain of management —
supply chain management and relationship marketing. As other managerial 
disciplines these two have a clear practical purpose — to provide business 
people with procedures and instruments for making transactions with sup-
pliers and customers efficient and effective. What are their relationships 
with the theory of the firm? We will talk about supply change management 
in this section and about relationship marketing in the next. 
                                        
17 They even draw a new model of the corporation where all stakeholders were al-
located in three concentric circles depending on the relative importance to the com-
pany: the inner circle Resource Base (employees, shareholders, creditors and cutom-
ers), the middle circle Industry Base (partners and alliances, supply chain associates, 
regulatory authorities), and the external circle Social Political Arena (local communi-
ties, governments, private organizations). The extended corporation embraces all three 
circles. 
 
As a practical activity the supply chain management (SCM) started to 
develop right with appearance of large scale production and assembly lines 
in early 20th century. But the term and its special emphasis were shaped in 
the 1980s when western companies were outperformed by some Asian 
counterparts and it became clear that the competition now was not just be-
tween individual firms but rather between entire supply chains. In 1990s it 
was even more intensified with globalization of supply chains and wide 
spread of outsourcing. But for long time the emphasis in SCM was on co-
ordination and optimization problems and various managerial solutions for 
them. It was the domain of operations management which traditionally ig-
nored behavioral issues which are central in the theory of the firm. Of 
course, this is a limitation, and eventually this fact was discovered by some 
activists of SCM community as well as people from the theory of the firm. 
Interestingly, the problem of cooperation between two disciplines was 
outlined by the guru of transaction cost economics (Williamson 2008). He 
underlined that two disciplines studied mostly the same subject but the 
TCE was much more parsimonious, operationalizable, and predictive than 
SCM. The latter was positioned by its activists as a comprehensive disci-
pline but actually this “comprehensiveness” reflects mostly methodological 
immatureness because a good theory should be simple, operationalizable 
and predictive (as is TCE). Although in this statement Williamson was ba-
sically correct his understanding of SCM was rather vague and his skepti-
cism about its relevance was so clear that an offended and protesting re-
sponse from SCM was followed immediately (Zipkin 2009).  
Nevertheless, this confessional clash was rather unnecessary and unpro-
ductive because the SCM field already had started to incorporate some in-
sights and frameworks from the TCE and other theories of the firm.  
The first such suggestion was made as early as in 1999 by Skjoett-
Larsen who proposed to build SCM on three different theoretical perspec-
tives: the transaction cost approach; the network perspective; and, the re-
source-based view. In combination, these economic, sociological and stra-
tegic approaches can provide logistics researchers and managers with a 
strong conceptual framework for analyzing supply chain management in 
theory and practice (Skjoett-Larsen, 1999). The similar idea of basing 
SCM on several complementary approaches was articulated once more a 
few years later by Halldorsson, Kotzab and Skjoett-Larsen (2003). 
In 2007, a year before Williamson’s paper, a special issue of Journal of 
Operations Management (vol. 25, issue 2) was devoted to the problems of 
integration of various organizational theories to SPM. These theories in-
cluded all major paradigms in the organization theory: the resource-based 
view, the knowledge-based view, strategic choice theory, agency theory, 
institutional theory, and systems theory. And many contributors of this 
journal issue made an attempt to incorporate the agency theory and trans-
action costs economics into supply chain analysis. As editors of this issue 
wrote (Ketchen, Hult 2007), “enormous opportunities exist to integrate in-
sights from organization theory and supply chain management in order to 
build understanding of why some supply chains excel while others do not” 
(italics is mine). Another recent review of this topic is (Lavassani, Mova-
hedi, Kumar, 2008). 
Of course, although these suggestions to build SCM on various behav-
ioural and organizational approaches were pronounced rather early the real 
implementation of this appeals may be still under question. We should look 
at modern textbooks on SCM to find out what steps have been actually 
made in this direction. 
As we see SCM does not pretend to be a new theory of the firm but ra-
ther to incorporate main achievements of the latter to better understanding 
of their own issues. Nevertheless, the next discipline of the same manage-
rial domain may pretend to be a distinctive approach for understanding the 
vertical integration theories domain and to add some new truth to the the-
ory of the firm. 
Relationship marketing 
The relationship marketing is based on the assumption that it is very im-
portant to build and maintain efficient and effective system of relationships 
between the buyer and the seller which would allow creating the superior 
quality and benefiting from this partnering in the long run. This paradigm 
was developed to replace the traditional marketing approach (transactional 
or 4Ps approach) where all transactions were viewed as one-time bargains. 
Now pure market transactions are seen as only one end of a continuum of 
various types of relations, at the other end of which there is fully integrated 
firm. The whole range looks like: pure market transactions, repeated 
transactions, long-term transactions, buyer-seller partnerships, strategic 
alliances, network organizations and vertical integration (Webster, 1992). 
 As we may see this menu of options remind the alternative govern-
ance structures discussed by Williamson and the theory of the firm. Never-
theless, the focus of relationship marketing is not at the choice between of 
these alternatives (in this case it would a duplication of the theory of the 
firm). Instead of this, the relationship marketing supports one fundamental 
belief: cooperation is better than competition, and with cooperation the 
long-term contracts may be the best alternative to vertical integration or 
arm’s length transactions. 
This belief is based on the assumption that in the global economy with 
its enormous pressure to increase quality, reduce inventory, and develop 
JIT, QR or VMI systems many firms have to choose single-sourcing in-
stead of multiple sources of supply. This means the replacement of the 
competitive model to a cooperative one. If the rivalry between suppliers in 
the traditional competition model is used to reduce costs, in the new coop-
erative model “both parties achieve lower costs but working together to 
lower both buyer’s and seller’s costs” (Wilson, 1995). This becomes possi-
ble through eliminations of unnecessary tasks and procedures and introduc-
ing new efficient and effective management systems. 
Therefore, the relationship marketing holds that the relational contracts 
is a highly valuable organizational form and tries to explore two basic 
questions: When these cooperative contracts are possible? What factors 
influence their performance? However, there is no uniformity in methods 
of analyzing these questions. 
Many researchers use a descriptive or an inductive approach — they try 
to list all important variables which may influence performance of buyer-
seller relationships and then to measure them in real business cases. Sheth 
(1996) suggests 10 important antecedents of effective supplier partnering: 
quality obsession, responsiveness, competence and professionalism, value 
engineering, mass customization, proactive innovation, frontline informa-
tion systems, supplier focused teams, supplier involved marketing and 
supplier retention compensation. The IMP group uses the concept of at-
mosphere — a multidimensional construct including such variables as 
power, dependence, cooperation, expectations, closeness etc. — and tries 
to measure the atmosphere of buyer-seller relationships through ethno-
graphic methods (Hakansson Wootz 1979). Another set of variables de-
scribing relationships was proposed by Wilson with colleagues (Wilson, 
Moller 1988; Han, Wilson 1993): commitment, trust, cooperation, mutual 
goals, interdependence, performance, comparison level of the alternative, 
adaptation, non-retrievable investments, shared technology, summative 
constructs, structural bonds, and social bonds. By measuring this set of 
variables they try to predict the future of relations — this is one of the 
theoretical assumptions of the authors. Another assumption is that these 
variables play different roles at different stages of relationships.  
Bur some researchers use a more deductive approach and employ con-
tract theory, organizational theory or some other paradigm to model the 
behavior of parties in buyer-seller relationships. What is important many of 
these authors assume that this is opportunistic behavior which prevents 
parties from efficient cooperation and it should be somehow removed to 
create conditions for efficient buyer-seller relationships. Achrol and Gund-
lach (1999) compare role of legal and cultural defenses preventing oppor-
tunism. Cannon, Achrol and Gundlach (2000) support the “plural form” 
thesis according to which a conjunction of legal and social mechanisms of 
governance is needed for effective buyer-seller relations. Anderson and 
Weitz (1992) study the role of pledges as idiosyncratic investments and 
contractual terms preventing opportunistic behavior. Heide and Jonh 
(1992) try to show that the assumption about potential threat of opportunis-
tic behavior in every contract is an exaggeration and many relationships 
are govern by norms.  Dant and Schul (1992) use organizational behavior 
and political science to analyze how conflict resolution is done in relational 
contracts. Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) use the metaphor of marriage 
when modeling the behavior of buyer and seller. 
As we may see, the relationship marketing literature employs a multiple 
variety of approaches and models. But the main distinction of its approach 
is an attempt to justify long-term contractual relationships as a viable and 
efficient alternative to vertical integration or pure market transactions.  
In the general theory of the firm it means that if the firm pays much at-
tention to building mutual trust and common behavioral norms then it may 
effectively use long-term contracts where only vertical integration or com-
petition among suppliers seemed to be possible.  
 
***  
As it was shown all mention above disciplines — sociological theories, 
resource-based view, knowledge-based view, dynamic capabilities ap-
proach, open innovations theory, stakeholder view, relationship marketing 
— can be productively used for analysis of the same question: what are the 
effective organizational forms of the production space. Nevertheless, they 
mostly do not represent alternatives to the general theory of firm as it was 
stated in the first two sections of this paper. They only underline one or 
another aspect of this general theory and focus on a deeper theoretical ex-
amination and empirical research of this aspect. That is why all these ap-
proaches may be named not as alternative theories of the firm but just ex-
tensions and interpretations of the one basic theory.  
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